Introduction
This survey primarily focusses on the incentives of …rms to sign collusive agreements in vertically di¤erentiated markets as, for instance, in cartels, mergers and alliances. It also studies the e¤ects of collusion on market prices and qualities.
The relationship between mergers and price-quality combinations has recently attracted increasing attention in empirical and theoretical I. O. literature. 1 On the empirical ground, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) found for instance a negative correlation between merging operations and number of existing radio stations with, in addition, an observed increase in radio formats varieties related to mergers. Sweeting (2010) and George (2007) reported similar evidence for U.S. radio music industry and Fan (2013) for U.S. newspapers market. In airline industries, Peters (2006) observed a reduction of ‡ight frequency in those market segments in which merging carriers compete most, while Mazzeo (2003) showed a deterioration of on-time performances following airline mergers.
In this chapter we introduce a number of game-theoretic tools which can be used to model …rm collusive agreements in vertically di¤erentiated markets. Section 2 quickly reviews the initial literature on price collusion in two-…rm di¤erentiated markets. Section 3 introduces a n-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market to study in more detail the incentives of …rms to form either the whole market cartel or partial cartels made of a subsets of adjacent …rms in the product space, with the aim to collude in prices. This exercise allows us to characterize the The remaining sections focus on the stability of collusion. Section 4, by associating a partition function game to the n-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market shows as a su¢cient condition for the coalitional stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of all …rms' qualities.
Without this feature, and in presence of highly asymmetric quality gaps, collusive agreements may be easily become unstable. Section 5 introduces a standard in…nite horizon game to show that an increase in the number of …rms in the market may have contradictory e¤ects on the incentive of …rms to collude: collusion may become easier for bottom and intermediate …rms and harder for the top quality …rm. Finally, in Section 6, by means of a three-…rm example, I consider the case in which colluding …rms can also decide endogenously their quality and price combinations. In such case, once merged, …rms are allowed to optimally reshape their qualities and prices according to the new market structure. From this, it can be checked whether full or partial cartelisations can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game, which now includes a coalition formation process taking place at the …rst stage. For this model we show that partial cartelisation always arises in equilibrium with the bottom quality …rm always belonging to the formed cartel. Section 7 concludes.
Collusion in a Vertically Di¤erentiated Duopoly
In his seminal paper Hackner (1994) analyses the relationship between collusion and vertical product di¤erentiation in an in…nitely repeated duopoly framework. The main issue here is to see whether price collusion is more or less likely to be sustained when the quality gap between …rms' products is higher. It is shown that the monopoly pricing is more easily reachable when products are closer along the quality ladder. Also, among the two …rms, the top quality …rm is the one possessing the highest incentive to break a collusive agreement. This is because with a large quality gap the pro…t of the top quality …rm is high even without collusion, and this makes the incentive to collude for this …rm weaker than for the bottom quality …rm. In a related paper, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) study how the stability of price collusion in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly can be a¤ected by the introduction of a minimum quality standard. The presence of a welfare-maximizing minimum quality standard can make the full collusive agreement harder to sustain. This is because the quality standard decreases the product di¤erentiation providing the bottom quality …rm with a stronger temptation to defect. 2 from the above analyses, two things can be noticed. The …rst is that, in both models considered above, the degree of product di¤erentiation does not change after a coalition has formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to pricing. This assumption is a natural entry point in the literature on cartel stability under product di¤erentiation, as it enables to disentangle the e¤ect of quality gap on the stability of cartels. Further, conceiving collusion in terms of pricing is particularly reasonable from a short-run perspective. Still, it leaves unexplored a companion question, namely the e¤ect of the cartel on product di¤erentiation. This analysis could be particularly pregnant in a long-run perspective since one cannot exclude that in a more extended time span a coalition (typically a cartel or a merger) entails structural changes, such as relocations of production facilities, or adjustment in the product range and quality.
The second is, instead, that in both papers the market is duopolistic and, as a result, any cooperation between the two …rms implies by de…nition a full market cartelisation. There exist remarkable examples in which …rms form partial alliances (i.e. those including a subset of …rms in the market) rather than the whole market coalition. Actually, In partial alliances colluding …rms can still compete against rival …rms outside the coalition, and the e¤ects of partial alliances or mergers are not equivalent to those observed when all …rms mimic the behaviour of a monopolist. Lambertini (2000) explores how cartel stability can be connected to the R&D activity in a duopoly in which the collusive quality choice may occur either under price or quantitysetting behaviour. 3 The issue concerning the alliance formation with more than two …rms in a vertically di¤erentiated market remain, however, unexplored, as also the e¤ect of partial collusion on market equilibrium. Scarpa (1998) models a vertical di¤erentiation market with three …rms competing in quality and prices. 4 In particular, he considers the role of a minimum quality standard, and highlights how the demand level of each …rm in a vertically di¤erentiated market only depends on quality and price of adjacent …rms in the product space. Indeed, since only adjacent variants compete against each other, under partial collusion de…ning the optimal set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization e¤ect that a variant produced by the coalition exerts within the coalition with the possibility that this variant steals consumers from the rival …rms (stealing e¤ect).
Other related papers are those by Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) , Gandhi et al. (2008) , Chen and Schwartz (2013) and Brekke et al. (2014) , all devoted to the analysis of price-quality post-merger re-positioning. 5 The …rst paper is inspired by Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and it is devoted to evaluate the pro…tability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The authors assume that the market is initially populated 3 A di¤erent strand of literature considers the possible impacts of R&D joint ventures on product market collusion. See on this, Martin (1995) , Lambertini et al. (2002) and Marini et al. (2014) . 4 recently Pezzino (2010) develops the same model under quantity competition. Cesi (2010) studies the e¤ect of two-…rm mergers in a three-…rm market in presence of a social-welfare maximizing minimum quality standard. 5 Other recent papers by Mazzeo (2002) , Einav (2003) and Seim (2006) look at the price-quality strategies decided by industry entrants. by three …rms and, therefore, two …rms can merge and decide on the number of brands to market. When the …xed cost of marketing a brand is 'high', the merged entity reduces its product range. This increases the pro…tability of mergers both under Bertrand and Cournot competition due to reduced marketing costs. With a 'low' cost of marketing, the e¤ect on the product range depends both on the nature of competition and on the degree of product di¤erentiation.
For example, under Cournot or Bertrand competition and su¢ciently di¤erentiated products, the non-merging …rm …nds pro…table to introduce a new brand, thereby damaging the merged entity. In order to highlight the impact of a merger on non-price competition, Gandhi et al. (2008) assume instead that …rms can instantaneously and costlessly reposition their products after a merger, thereby choosing both price and location in a Hotelling market. They show that after a merger the products are repositioned away from each other to reduce the resulting cannibalization e¤ect. Consequently, non-merging substitutes are repositioned between the merged products and, after all these location strategies, the merged …rm's incentive to raise prices decreases. Similarly, in a Hotelling framework, Chen and Schwartz (2013) analyse the incentive for …rms to introduce a product innovation when proposing a merger-to-monopoly.
In contrast to Arrow's …nding for process innovation, where the monopolist never undertakes R&D e¤orts to innovate, in this paper the incentive to invest in incremental product innovations can be higher for the merged entity (a monopolist) than for a rival facing competition from the existing good. Indeed, the monopolist can coordinate the pricing of the two products overcompensating the erosion of pro…ts coming from cannibalization. In a spatial competition model à la Salop with three ex ante identical …rms, Brekke et al. (2014) show that any two-…rm merger reduces its product quality whereas the non-merging …rm responds increasing its quality. Final prices can either increase or decrease according to the responsiveness of demand functions. Moreover, it is shown that if a merger entails the closure of one of the two merged …rms, this always leads to higher qualities and prices for all …rms in the market.
3 Collusion in a n-…rm Vertically Di¤erentiated Market As underlined above, although easily interpretable, a two-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market possesses a few limitations and does not allow a full- ‡edged analysis of market partial cartelisation. Therefore, in this …rst modelling section we simply extend a traditional model à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) to a n-…rm market in order to see the main implications in terms of pricing behaviour under collusion. 6 Let n …rms k = 1; 2; :::; n supply n di¤erent quality variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n with q k 2 (0; 1) and q n > q n 1 > ::: > q 1 to a population of consumers. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) consumers are indexed by and uniformly distributed in the interval [0; ], with < 1. As usual, the parameter captures consumers' willingness to pay for quality: the higher ; the higher the baseline utility gained when consuming variant q k of the product. Each consumer can either buy one unit of a variant or not buying at all.
Formally, a simple way to represent consumer's utility is
where p k is the price set by …rm k, such that p k 2 [0; p], where 0 < p < 1 is a given upper bound on prices. From the above formulation, the marginal consumer buying variant k = 1 is
and the market is partially uncovered, with some consumers excluded from buying even the bottom-quality variant. In general, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant k 1 and k for k = 2; 3; :::; n is
where p k > p k 1 for every k = 1; 2; 3; :::; n. For the time being, we assume that product qualities are exogenously given and we disregard costs to simplify calculations. 7
When considering price competition, the payo¤s of all …rms can be easily characterized by describing the payo¤ of three types of …rms in the quality spectrum: (i) top quality, (ii) intermediate quality and (iii) bottom quality …rm. The top quality …rm (denoted k = n) sets a price p n to maximize its pro…t n = D n p n = p n p n 1 q n q n 1 p n :
Conversely, every intermediate …rm k = 2; 3; :::; n 1 maximizes
Finally, the bottom-quality …rm (k = 1), maximizes
The optimal reply of every noncooperative …rm can be easily obtained as follows:
p n (p n 1 ) = 1 2 (p n 1 + (q n q n 1 )) :
for the top quality …rm (k = n)
for every intermediate quality …rm k = 2; 3; :::; n 1 and
for the bottom quality …rm (k = 1).
Expressions (2)-(4) show that prices and qualities are strategic complements for all …rms ( @ 2 k k @p k @q k > 0) and the best-reply of every …rm shifts outward as due to an increase in its quality. On the other hand, for every …rm k, an increase in the quality of direct rivals' products q j , for j = (k + 1) and (k 1) causes a negative e¤ect on its pro…t ( @ k @p k @q j < 0) and price-competition becomes tougher as a result. Note also that, from (2)-(4), all …rms' pro…t functions are concave in their own prices and also their choice sets are compact and convex and their best-replies are contractions, 8 in such a way that the existence of a unique (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium n-price vector p associated to the n variants (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n ) is guaranteed for any (…nite) number of …rms competing in the market. 9 8 See Gabszewicz et. al (2016a) . 9 See, for instance Friedman (1991) , p.84.
Full price collusion
When …rms form the whole market cartel, they can be assumed to maximize the sum of all …rms' payo¤s:
For every colluding …rm k = 1; :::; n, the …rst-order condition writes as 10
Since the top quality-…rm k = n in the cartel internalizes the payo¤ of its lower-quality neighbour, its optimal reply writes as p c n (p n 1 ) = p n 1 + 2 (q n q n 1 ) :
Along the same rationale, for all intermediate …rms k = 2; 3; :::; (n 1) which are members of the cartel, the optimal reply writes as
since they internalize the payo¤ of their adjacent neighbour members of the cartel. Finally, the optimal reply of the bottom quality …rm k = 1 is given by
As already pointed out by Gabszewiz et al. (1986) and, more recently, by Gabszewicz et al.
(2016a), in a model in which unit costs vary only mildly with quality, under full price collusion the n …rms set prices p c k such that their market shares are nil for all …rms except for the topquality one (k = n). In particular, under full collusion, for every …rm k = 1; 2; ::; n and j < k, it is easy to obtain prices as
< 0 for i = 2; 3; :::; n 1, and, therefore, the joint pro…t N is concave in every …rm's price pi. The same condition holds for the two extreme …rms along the quality spectrum, i.e. i = 1 and i = n.
Inserting (12) in every …rm's market share D k , we obtain for the bottom quality …rm,
where j = (q j q j 1 ) denotes the quality gap of every …rm j selling goods of lower or equal quality than …rm k, and 1 = (q 1 q 0 ) = q 1 . Moreover, inserting (12) in every intermediate quality …rm's market share k , we obtain:
for the top quality …rm. Thus, when colluding together all …rms cover only half of the market and the whole market payo¤ is:
Partial cartels
In many cases …rms can organize themselves in a coalition structure (partition) of the N …rms di¤erent from the grand coalition, C = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m ), with m n. However, in a vertically di¤erentiated market every …rm can e¤ectively distort prices by colluding either with its left (lower quality) or with right (higher quality) or with both its local competitors. 11
In what follows we introduce a few simple de…nitions helping to develop the analysis of partial cartelisation. In order to a¤ect prices, …rms can form bottom, intermediate or top quality cartels. To each of these members, the …rst order condition of pro…t maximization writes as:
(i) in the case of interior cartel members:
leading to the optimal reply function
where the superscript pc stands for partial collusion.
(ii) In the case of lower boundary cartel member:
leading to the best-reply function
(iii) Finally, in the case of upper boundary cartel member:
leading to the best-reply function Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 In a generic partition of the n …rms P = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m ) organized in m < n non trivial cartels, a total of 2m + (n z) 1 (resp. 2m + (n z)) variants are put on sale in the market when the partition includes (resp. does not include) the bottom cartel, for z = s 1 + s 2 + :::+ s m , where s j , for j = 1; 2; :::; m, denotes the cardinality of every cartel.
In order to complete the characterization of every partial cartelisation of the market we can provide a price comparison for all …rms under partial cartelisation with respect to both fully noncooperative and fully collusive cases.
Proposition 2 Under partial cartelisation the …rms set prices p pc k higher or equal than the corresponding prices p k charged at the noncooperative price equilibrium and lower than the corresponding full collusive prices p c k .
Proof. Let us assume, for simplicity, that only one cartel S N has formed, and that the remaining …rms play as singletons. Note, however, that the same reasoning would apply to the case with more than one cartel. It can be easily checked that the joint pro…t of an arbitrary cartel S is continuous and concave with respect to every …rm's price p k , for k 2 S.
Moreover, the optimal reply of every partially collusive …rm k 2 S is a contraction and, hence, a unique partially collusive price pro…le p pc exists for any given level of qualities q 1 ; q 2 ; :::q n , under the assumption that all …rms with unsold goods set their equilibrium prices exactly at the levels for which the sales become nil. 12 Thus, we can: (a) start with a pro…le p of Nash equilibrium prices. (b) Let the …rms in S N reply according to their optimal collusive replies. A quick comparison between optimal replies under partial cartelisation (??)-(??) and
purely noncooperative Nash equilibrium shows that the former are always steeper than the latter and, since they are in both cases positively sloped, all …rms in the cartel will set higher prices than in the noncooperative scenario. (c) Similarly an increase in prices will also occur to all …rms in the fringe playing noncooperatively: given the higher prices of the cartel, they will respond, in turn, increasing their prices. (d) The described adjustment process, given the contraction property of all …rms' optimal replies, will converge to a new pro…le of prices such that p pc k > p k for all k = 1; 2; :::; n. Inequality p c k > p pc k , for every k = 1; 2; :::; n, can be proved along similar lines.
A Cooperative Approach to the Stability of the Whole Industry Agreement
In this section we consider the incentive of …rms to form the whole industry cartel (grand coalition). Following Gabszewicz et al (2016b) , a partition function game can be associated to the vertically di¤erentiated market introduced in Section 3 and, from this, it can be proved that the core of this game is nonempty when the qualities of the products sold by the …rms are equispaced along the quality spectrum. Moreover, it can be easily shown that, when this regularity condition does not hold, the core can be empty. Thererfore, a fully collusive agreement among …rms is more easily reachable when there are neither too large nor too asymmetric gaps between …rms' qualities. The symmetry in quality gaps helps to maintain the discipline of thewhole market cartel just because it reduces the incentive of …rms to free-ride by leaving the agreement.
Following Gabszewicz et al. (2016b) we adopt the concept of delta core by Hart and Kurz (1983) , also denoted projection core in the recent axiomatization by Bloch and van den Nouweland (2014) . Since for the case of vertically di¤erentiated markets the coalitional worth possesses positive coalition externalities, 13 the delta or projection-core is the smallest core and, therefore, its existence implies the existence of all other possible versions of core in games with simultaneous moves. 14 To prove our result we can formally associate to the vertically di¤erentiated market described above a partition function game P = (N; v (S; C)), where N is the set of …rms and v(S; C) 2 R + is the worth associated to every coalition of …rms S N belonging to a coalition structure C 2 C. In our model, when a cartel S N forms, its maximal coalitional payo¤ is obtained when the remaining …rms in N nS stick together in the complementary coalition fN nSg. Therefore, if the core of the partition function game P exists when the coalitional worth v(S; C) is computed for C = (S; N nS), it will a fortiori exist for any other partition of the …rms in N nS.
1 3 This means that every …rm is advantaged when rivals merge in coalitions 1 4 Gabszewicz et al (2016b) use this notion of core in order to provide the strongest core existence result. Demanges (1994) provides general conditions for core existence in economies producing di¤erentiated goods, although in absence of externalities between coalitions. Zhao (2013) examined the existence of -, -and -core in a three-…rm linear Cournot oligopoly with di¤erent marginal costs. In a di¤erentiated quantity oligopoly with three (or four …rms) Watanabe and Matsubayashi (2013) show that for any degree of product di¤erentiation the core is nonempty while the -core only exists in presence of high product di¤erentiation. For a more detailed account of the works dealing with coalitional agreements in oligopoly games, see Marini (2009) and Currarini and Marini (2015) . Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Let market variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n be equispaced with (q k q k 1 ) = 2 (0; 1) for all k = 1; 2; :::; n, with q 0 = 0. Then, the core of the partition function game P = (N; v (S; C)) associated to the n-…rm vertically di¤erentiated market is nonempty. is the pro…t of every …rm k when in competition with its complementary coalition N n fkg.
As the simple example below shows, when the quality gaps among …rms widely di¤er, the core can be empty.
An Empty Core Example
Let us assume four …rms in the market, i .e. N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, initially selling four di¤erent qualities q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 . Let now the …rms fully collude by forming the grand coalition. Let now the top cartel S T = f2; 3; 4g decide to leave the grand coalition and coalition structure C = (f1g ; f2; 3; 4g) form as a result. In this case, the top cartel obtains: (f1g;f2;3;4g) T = 2 q 2 q 3 (q 3 q 2 ) (4q 3 q 2 ) 2 + 1 4 2 (4q 2 q 4 q 1 q 4 3q 1 q 2 ) (4q 2 q 1 ) : For = 1, q 1 = 1, q 2 = 5 and q 4 = 10 and q 3 > 7: 26, the quality gap between q 2 and q 3 (both produced inside the cartel) becomes su¢ciently high for (f1g;f2;3;4g) T + (f1g;f2;3;4g) 1 > fN g N = 1 4 2 q 4 = 2:5 and the core is, therefore, empty. If all products are equipaced, with q 1 = 2:5, q 2 = 5, q 3 = 7:5 and q 4 = 10, Moreover, it can be checked that all other feasible deviations by single or coalitions of …rms do not improve upon the grand coalition allocations. Core existence is, in such a way, guaranteed.
A Noncooperative Approach to the Stability of the Whole

Industry Agreement
In this section we test the stability of the whole industry cartel using a standard repeated-game approach. For this purpose, we use the model with equispaced variants, which is su¢ciently tractable. 15 We already obtained in Section 3 the monopoly payo¤. What is required to characterize the standard grim strategy of a standard in…nite-horizon extension of the vertically di¤erentiated model is to make explicit the noncooperative equilibrium payo¤s of all …rms and, as a second aspect, to de…ne their defection payo¤s obtained when playing their best-replies when all other rivals collude. Finally, an intuitive allocation rule has to be introduced to divide the fully collusive payo¤ among the n heterogeneous …rms. In what follows we derive the price vector obtained at the Nash equilibrium of every constituent game under the equispaced product assumption.
Proposition 4 Let market variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n be equispaced and such that q k q k 1 = for every k = 1; 2; :::; n, with q 0 = 0. Then, the noncooperative Nash equilibrium price vector for all …rms k = 1; 2; :::; n is given by:
and for b 1 = 2 + p 3 and b 2 = 2 p 3 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
If we assume the existence of quadratic quality costs for each …rm c(q k ) = q 2 k 2 , their noncooperative payo¤s can be written as
Now, since the fully collusive price under equally spaced variants is, for every …rm k = 1; 2; :::; n p c k = 1 2 k;
we can easily characterize the fully collusive pro…t of every …rm (before any transfer takes place) as c k = 2 (k) 4 ( k) 2 2 :
One way to devide the fully collusive pro…t among all …rms is to use the following natural quality-ranking:
for every k = 1; 2; :::; n, which substantially corresponds to the position of each …rm in the equispaced quality space.Therefore, using the fact that P k=1;:::;n r k = n(n + 1) 2 at the fully collusive agreement we can simply assign to every …rm a personalised share equal to: k = r k P k=1;:::;n r k = 2k n(n + 1) :
Finally, using every …rm's noncooperative best-replies we can easily obtain every …rm's defection pro…t as: Thus, for the full collusion to be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the in…nite horizon game (via a grim strategy) the discount factor of every …rm has to respect the following condition
for all k = 1; 2; :::; n 1 and n ( ; ; n) d n n c n d n n = n 2 2 8
for k = n. 16 From the above expressions, the following proposition follows.
Proposition 5 Let market variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q n be equispaced with q k q k 1 = for every k = 1; 2; :::; n and q 0 = 0. Let also every …rm's share of the monopoly pro…t be determined by its quality ranking, as k = 2 (k) =n(n + 1). Then, an increase in the number of …rms n reduces the discount factor sustaining the fully cooperative agreement as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game via a grim strategy for all …rms k = 1; 2; 3; :::; n 1, while it increases the discount factor of the top quality …rm k = n (for n > 3).
Proof. This can be obtained from straightforward manipulations of expressions (10)-(11).
Proposition 5 helps to see that, in vertically di¤erentiated markets, under equispaced variants, an increase in the number of …rms has contradictory e¤ects on the incentive of …rms to collude: it makes collusion easier to sustain for bottom and for intermediate quality …rms but, at the same time, it makes it harder for the top quality …rm. This result is somehow surprising if compared to the usual view that collusion is more easily sustainable when the number of …rms is small, whereas it becomes usually harder when the number of …rms increases.
1 6 Note that a constraint for > p n p 2 must be imposed for both collusive and noncooperative …rms' payo¤s to be nonnegative.
Mergers and Alliances with Endogenous Qualities
To the best of our knowledge, a full- ‡edged theoretical study of the e¤ects of alliances and mergers on market prices and qualities in a vertically di¤erentiated industry with more than two …rms has not yet been provided. Similarly unexplored is the analysis of mergers stability between …rms in vertically di¤erentiated markets when …rms can re-shape prices and qualities of the products after mergers. Anecdotal evidence shows that mergers and acquisitions often occur among …rms selling fairly di¤erentiated products along the quality spectrum. and Air-Inter in 1999 or between Lufthansa and Air Dolomiti in 2003. 18 In a similar vein, the automotive industry is plenty of examples of premium car producers taking over economy car manufacturers, as in the merger occurring between Volkswagen Group and Skoda in 1991 or between Nissan and Renault in 1999.
One consequence of these consolidation processes is often which to re-position the lower quality brand towards a higher segment of the market or, in some other cases, to un-brand intermediate quality products as to create a …ghting brand able to compete more aggressively with the …rms positioned at the bottom of the quality spectrum. However, the latter strategy appears usually more as a temporary than a permanent strategy, since a …ghting brand may risk to cannibalize the market of the merging …rms. Ultimately, a consolidated group can …nd more advantageous to re-brand its economy products rather than un-brand some of its In Gabszewicz et al. (2015) we introduce a simple framework in which three ex ante heterogeneous …rms, initially producing three vertically di¤erentiated goods, low (…rm 1), medium (…rm 2) and high (…rm 3), enter a negotiation to decide whether to merge or not with some or all rival …rms and, once merged, optimally reshape the qualities and prices according to the new market structure.
Assume as in Gabszewicz et al. (2015) a three-stage game where, at the …rst stage, every …rm expresses its willingness to form an alliance or, alternatively, to stay as singleton. Then, at the second and third stage each formed coalition can decide, in turn, the qualities and prices of its goods. An alliance can either contains all …rms in the market (grand coalition), as N = f1; 2; 3g or, alternatively, be formed by a nonempty subset S N of …rms, with S 2 N , where N = 2 N n f?g is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the N …rms: N = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g) :
Thus, the set C of all coalition structures C which can be formed by the three …rms is: C = ((f1g ; f2g ; f3g) ; (f1; 2g ; f3g) ; (f1g ; f2; 3g) ; (f1; 3g ; f2g) ; (f1; 2; 3g)) :
The game can be solved backward to analyse the prices and qualities selected in equilibrium by …rms under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate coalition structure has formed at the …rst stage. As in Bloch (1995 Bloch ( , 1996 and Ray and Vohra (1999) , the coalition formation game can be assumed sequential, with an exogenous order of play. Di¤erently from them, since …rms are ex ante heterogeneous, it is assumed that every …rm proposes not only an alliance, but also a division of the coalition payo¤. Each recipient of the proposal can either accept or reject the o¤er and, in case of rejection, it becomes its turn to make a proposal. The game is assumed …nite-horizon and every …rm only possesses one turn of proposal at each period. 20
Since prices and qualities are selected in a sequence by every formed coalition, the payo¤s accruing to a …rm or a coalition in each feasible coalition structure can be easily obtained as follows: (f1g ; f2g ; f3g) 1 = 0:00005 2 = 0:00124 3 = 0:02348 (f1; 2; 3g) fN g (f1;2;3g) = 0:03125 (f1; 2g ; f3g) (f1;2g;f3g) f1;2g = 0:00152 (f1;2g;f3g) 3 = 0:02443 (f1; 3g ; f2g) (f1;3g;f2g) f1;3g = 0:02443 (f1;3g;f2g) 2 = 0:00152 (f1g ; f2; 3g) (f1g;f2;3g) 1 = 0:00152 (f1g;f2;3g) f2;3g = 0:02443 Table 1 -Firm payo¤s in every coalition structure.
It turns out that, although the qualities and prices arising in each partial merger do not vary, the pro…ts accruing to …rms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong (compete).
Moroever, using the above payo¤s, it can be shown that, although the full monopolization of the market is the most pro…table outcome of the game, in a …nite-horizon sequential game of coalition formation the incentive for …rms to enter a whole industry merger is dominated by that to form partial mergers. In particular, the …nite-horizon sequential coalition formation game reaches the results described by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) When the high quality …rm 3 is the initiator of the sequential coalition formation game, the only stable coalition structure is C 12:3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g), where …rm 3 continues to produce the top variant q 3 and the two remaining …rms 1 and 2 only market intermediate Proof. See Gabszewicz et al. (2015) .
Notice that, both in (i) and (ii) the initiator of the game never belongs to an alliance in equilibrium. Indeed, the payo¤ of a …rm when it remains singleton (rationally expecting that the other …rms will prefer to merge) dominates that of being part of the grand coalition, since in the latter case the distribution of pro…ts would be unfavourable to the initial proposer.
The equilibrium pro…t accruing to either …rm 2 or 3 when initiating the game and competing against an alliance is, therefore, larger than when they are part of the alliance. The optimal strategy is, therefore, to induce the remaining …rms to merge. A di¤erent result arises when …rm 1 (the bottom quality one) begins the negotiation process. In this case, …rm 1 cannot credibly commit to remain independent since the remaining …rms (2 and 3) prefer to play as singletons than forming an alliance (see Table 1 ). This is due to the fact that the alliance between …rm 2 and 3 is problematic since in this circumstance 2 would optimally leapfrog the bottom quality …rm, ending up by sharing the top quality …rm's duopoly payo¤, which is lower than the sum of …rms' pro…ts under triopoly. Knowing in advance the infeasibility of coalition f2; 3g, …rm 1 would prefer to let …rm 3 playing independently and, then, form an alliance with …rm 2.
A striking result of this model is that all equilibrium mergers always contains the bottom quality …rm which, in all cases, drops its low-quality variant from the market. In particular, whoever is the additional player included in a coalition (either the intermediate or the top quality …rm), equilibrium prices and qualities always coincide with that observed in the case of a duopoly, with a high-quality …rm competing against a low-quality rival, as in Motta (1992) .
At …rst sight, this result seems to be counterintuitive. A natural conjecture would be that either the range of variants or the quality gap between variants in the market would change with the players involved in the alliance. This model shows instead that only pro…ts accruing to the single …rms change with the type of partial merger, range of products, quality gap and price being unchanged. Indeed, the cannibalization e¤ect and the stealing e¤ect induce the merger, whatever its members, to withdraw from the market the lowest quality variant between the set which can be produced a priori. Interestingly, depending on the intensity of these e¤ects, in some circumstances this variant is withdrawn from the market at the price stage, in some other circumstances at the quality stage. In particular, the merger formed by the intermediate quality and by the low-quality …rm stops immediately to market the bottom-quality product at the price stage. In contrast, the merger formed by the top and the bottom-quality …rm keeps the bottom product (as a …ghting brand) at the price stage whereas ultimately drops it at the quality stage. As argued above, keeping a …ghting brand in an alliance is mostly a short-run (price) than a medium/long run strategy (quality) and it is, therefore, dropped when the merging group can re-position its product lines. Finally, it is found that, in all equilibrium (partial) mergers, the bottom-quality …rm is always present. This appears in line with numerous theoretical and experimental studies on coalition formation in triads of heterogeneous individuals, i.e. possessing di¤erent skills or …ghting ability (e.g. Caplow 1956 , 1959 , 1968 , Vinacke and Arko¤ 1957 , Gamson 1961 . A central conclusion of these studies is that "weakness is strength" (see, for instance, Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011, p.189) , with this meaning that less-powered individuals have usually more chances to be part of a coalition.
The results of this coalition formation game con…rms that the most likely mergers occur between intermediate and bottom-quality producers, with the premium quality brands preferably running alone. This is the case of some top car producers (as, for instance, Daimler-Benz) whose only participation is in a few speci…c projects. What the model results also indicate, is that mergers between intermediate and bottom quality …rms, as those occurred between Volkswagen and Skoda, or between Fiat and Chrysler in the automotive industry, should be the norm. In these cases the intermediate quality product is withdrawn from the market, which can be interpreted saying that of all products sold by the merger have a tendency to converge towards the same level of quality of their premium brand products. The model also stresses how also the mergers between top and bottom quality …rms are likely, as for instance those recently occurred between generics pharmaceutical manufacturers and premium brand pharmaceutical companies. The model results just suggest that in this case the bottom quality products can be pro…tably retired from the market to soften the competition among remaining goods.
Concluding Remarks
The rationale underlying many of the result presented in this paper can be found in the nature of competition among vertically di¤erentiated …rms. Indeed, in any cartel or merger, the optimal set of products to market is de…ned by balancing the cannibalization e¤ect within the coalition with the stealing e¤ect occurring between a coalition and the …rms outside.
It was shown that the bottom quality variant in a group of colluding …rms is kept on sale in the market only when such a cartel needs it as a sort of …ghting brand to protect itself from all lower quality variants sold by the fringe of competitors. In any other case a cartel prefers to withdraw from the market all its low quality variants. In this way …rms can soften price competition in the market and magnify the quality di¤erentiation between the variants remained on sale. This view seems in line with the empirical …ndings, where mergers emphasize "product di¤erentiation" among merging …rms as well as with respect to their outside rivals.
Partial mergers can, therefore be viewed as a means to enhance the dynamic competition for the market and to reduce the static competition in the market.
Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Gabszewicz et al. 2016a) . Take a generic intermediate cartel of h n 2 …rms initially selling variants q k ; q k+1 ; q k+2 ; :::; q k+h and competing, both with a left-hand fringe of independent …rms selling lower quality variants q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q k 1 and with a righ-hand fringe selling, alternatively, higher quality variants q k+h+1 ; q k+h+2 ; :::; q n . Using expressions (14)-(16) the optimal-replies of the …rms in the cartel 
where only the two extreme …rms k and k + h in the cartel are directly competing with the …rms outside. Without loss of generality, take a generic …rm inside the cartel producing an intermediate variant (i.e neither the bottom nor the top quality within the cartel), say …rm k + 1. Using both the optimal reply of …rm k + 1 and those of the …rms connected to it (i.e. …rms k and k + 2) and re-arranging, we obtain the optimal replies of these three …rms as functions of p k 1 and p k+3 only. p k = p pc k (p k 1 ; p k+3 ) = 1 2 p k 1 (q k+3 q k ) + 2p k+3 (q k q k 1 ) q k+3 q k 1 ; p k+1 = p pc k+1 (p k 1 ; p k+3 ) = 1 2 p k 1 (q k+3 q k+1 ) + 2p k+3 (q k+1 q k 1 ) q k+3 q k 1 ; p k+2 = p pc k+2 (p k 1 ; p k+3 ) = 1 2 p k 1 (q k+3 q k+2 ) + 2p k+3 (q k+2 q k 1 ) q k+3 q k 1 :
Using the above, we can easily compute the optimal market share of …rm (k + 1) as D k+1 (p k ;p k+1 ;p k+2 ) =p k+2 p k+1 q k+2 q k+1 p k+1 p k q k+1 q k = 0 which proves that under partial collusion every intermediate …rm of an intermediate cartel obtains zero market share. Repeating now the same procedure for the …rm producing the lowest quality in the cartel (here …rm k), we obtain instead that D k (p k ;p k+1 ;p k 1 ) =p k+1 p k q k+1 q k p k p k 1 q k q k 1 = 1 2p k 1 (q k q k 1 ) > 0
forp k 1 > 0. Finally, computing the optimal replies of the highest quality …rm in the cartel, i.e. …rm (k + h), and of the …rms directly connected to it, we obtaiñ p k+h 1 (p k+h 2 ; p k+h ) = p k+h 2 (q k+h 1 q k+h 2 ) + p k+h (q k+h 1 q k+h 2 ) q k+h q k+h 2 p k+h (p k+h 1 ; p k+h+1 ) = p k+h 1 (q k+h+1 q k+h ) + 1 2 p k+h+1 (q k+h q k+h 1 ) q k+h+1 q k+h 1 p k+h+1 (p k+h ; p k+h+2 ) = 1 2 p k+h (q k+h+2 q k+h+1 ) + p k+h+2 (q k+h+1 q k+h ) q k+h+2 q k+h :
Using the above, D k+h (p k+h 1 ;p k+h ;p k+h+1 ) =p k+h+1 p k+h q k+h+1 q k+h p k+h p k+h 1 q k+h q k+h 1 = = 1 2p k+h+1 (q k+h q k+h 1 ) > 0.
showing that only the variants produced by the two …rms at the extremes of this (generic) intermediate cartel are sold at prices implying positive market shares. Exactly the same procedure proves that, in a top cartel, only the highest and the lowest quality variants initially sold by the cartel remain on sale.
Finally, let us consider a bottom cartel, i.e. a cartel formed by …rms 1; 2; :::; h initially selling h variants q 1 ; q 2 ; ::::q h and competing with (n h) independent …rms selling the higher quality variants q h+1 ; q h+2 ; :::; q n . Again, we can apply the same argument used above to show that every …rm in the interior of the cartel (i.e neither selling the lowest quality nor the highest quality variant in the cartel) obtains zero market share. Also, for the top quality …rm in the cartel (here …rm h), we obtain that D h (p h ;p h 1 ;p h+1 ) > 0: Finally, when considering a …rm selling the lowest quality variant in any bottom cartel, its market share simply writes as:
D 1 (p 2 ; p 1 ) = p 2 p 1 q 2 q 1 p 1 q 1 ;
that, using …rm' s 1 optimal collusive reply p pc 1 (p 2 ) = q 1 q 2 p 2 , becomes D 1 (p 2 ;p 1 ) = p 2 q 1 q 2 p 2 q 2 q 1 q 1 q 2 p 2 q 1 = 0;
showing that, di¤erently from other cartels, a bottom cartel optimally produces only its topquality variant q h . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under equispaced variants, from (6), for all k = 1; 2; :::; n best-replies are p k = 1 4 (p k+1 + p k 1 ) which can be written as a second-order di¤erence equation as p k+1 4p k + p k 1 = 0;
with complementary function Ab k+1 4Ab k + Ab k 1 = 0:
and whose associated characteristic function possesses two distinct real roots given by b 1 = 2 + p 3, b 2 = 2 p 3;
implying
Moreover, using the fact that for the bottom quality …rm, p 1 = 1 4 p 2 = 1 4 (p 2 + p 0 )
we can set
Finally, using the fact that for the top quality …rm p n = 1 2 (p n 1 + )
we just write 2p n p n 1 = that implies
and, then,
As a …nal step, we insert coe¢cients A 1 and A 2 in (20), obtaining
for every k = 1; 2; :::; n and b 1 = 2 + p 3 and b 2 = 2 p 3 , which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
